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I. Introduction: Can There be a Jurisprudence or Law of Peace? The Questions 
For too long attaining “justice” has been defined by fights, struggles and “winning” 
rights.  As Robert Cover acknowledged eloquently, years ago, the law can be 
“violent.”1 Judges who interpret law, legislators who make law, and lawyers who 
argue conclusions of law all create categories of pain and death, of winning and 
losing, of gain and loss, in rigid legal dividing lines of “justice,” that can have grave 
and serious consequences.  These categories of law and their interpretations can 
create, with words and acts, a strong-armed “violent” way of creating polar divisions 
of right(s) and wrong(s) and separation of wrongdoers from those “wronged.”  Many 
justice seekers today still conceive of rights in such on-off and brittle terms, though the 
language of rights has also been creative, in developing new rights, and many new 
sites for their definitions, claims, and sometimes enforcement.2  
For me, there are many questions implicated in the consideration of whether legal 
rights alone create justice or a “just world”: Does a demand for legal justice necessarily result 
in human justice?3  As moral and legal philosophers have debated the relationship of 
                                                
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine Law School and A.B. 
Chettle Professor of Law, Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure, Georgetown University 
Law Center.  Thanks to Yxta Murray for organizing this panel and the staff of Unbound for 
excellent hosting and conversation, and especially Max Utzschneider and Carl Lisberger for 
stimulating comments and questions on this essay.  It is amazing to me that the struggles on 
these subjects continue and I am so pleased to meet a new generation of serious student 
activists and scholars.  This article is dedicated to one of those next generation of justice 
advocates, my former student, Edgar Aguilasocho, graduate of the inaugural class of UCI Law 
School and justice and virtue philosopher extraordinaire.  And, I thank my life partner, 
Robert Meadow, political theorist and practical strategist, who engages, with his critical eyes, 
in my efforts to make a peaceful world, in this case, in the middle of a period of senseless 
violence in our own country and the world. 
1 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (“Legal interpretation takes 
place in a field of pain and death.  This is true in several senses.  Legal interpretative acts 
signal and occasion the imposition of violence on others: A judge articulates her understanding 
of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his 
life.”); see also MARTHA MINOW, MICHAEL RYAN & AUSTIN SARAT, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE 
AND THE LAW: ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (1992). 
2 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); LYNN HUNT, INVENTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2007). 
3 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It, Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic 
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J.  2663 (1995). 
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“positive” law to morality, I want here to consider the relationship of formal law to 
the achievement not only of “legal justice” (justice according to legal principles), but 
what human beings experience when they seek “human” (or social) justice.  As in the 
famous Fuller-Hart debate on the morality of law,4 I seek here to start or continue a 
conversation about whether law and legal principles are either necessary or sufficient 
for human beings to experience the world as just and “safe” (peaceful) enough for 
human flourishing.  This is a big question and here I only outline some preliminary 
thoughts on some of the answers, based on both biographical experiences and my 
own scholarly and practical engagement with these issues in a variety of comparative 
legal, historical and sociological arenas.  My observations here are drawn, in large 
measure, from my work as a peace seeker and mediator, who seeks not to cut legal 
and human categories with too sharp (or blunt?) a tool, but seeks instead to examine 
the “and” (or peaceful coexistence) of human differences.   
In this essay I set out some questions about whether law can be made a site of 
encouraging more positive, peace seeking, non-violent, and pro-social behaviors.  
These questions derive from my own family history, as well as from my experience as 
a social and political activist, and also as a practicing lawyer and legal scholar.  I begin 
in this introduction by setting out these questions in light of current conditions of 
domestic and international violence and some past considerations of categories of law.  
In the second section of this essay I explain where my questions come from—my 
personal and professional biography—and how these influences have led to my 
conclusions, in the third section, that there is no one right way forward.  Rather, we 
need process pluralism, as well as different substantive commitments, to advance a 
society of true social justice and peace, with appreciation, empathy and sympathy for 
human differences and more varied modes of working and living together.  In the 
fourth section of this essay I explore whether we, as human beings, actually have the 
capacity (biologically and historically) to aspire to develop a social consciousness able 
to support a more peaceful existence.  In the fifth section I explore how our modern 
social and legal consciousness is attempting to grapple with the tensions implicit in 
searches for both justice and peace at the same time.  In the sixth section I set out 
some possibilfities for seriously considering what it would mean to construct a non-
violence jurisprudence.  Finally, in the last section I point out some of the limits of a 
jurisprudence of non-violence in the face of on-going violence and evil in the world, 
and ask if we can maintain the hopefulness and optimism needed to effectuate a more 
peaceful co-existence in a world that challenges our commitments at almost every 
turn.  
                                                
4 See Lon Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964), and Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply 
to Professor Hart, 71 HARVARD L. REV. 630 (1958) and H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
(1961, 2d ed. 1997), for the classic debate about whether morality is both larger and more 
capacious, and unachievable through the enactment of positive law or whether positive law is 
the full measure of human agency around issues of right and wrong and justice creation.   As I 
write this Ronald Dworkin has just died and even the New York Times Obituary has 
attempted to explain this complex legal philosophical divide to the general public.  See Ronald 
Dworkin, Legal Philosopher Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013).  
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I begin with the questions of how laws and legal process do or do not bring us 
closer to peace and non-violence in a still unjust world: Are the legal dividing lines of 
right and wrong always the best way to achieve justice?  Are there laws and norms 
that could move us closer, rather than further away, from peace and non-violence and 
caring for each other?  Is law what polices us or what can turn us toward each other, 
rather than away?  Can theories of law and justice move us to a better world or 
merely a world in which people know their legal place?  Is the absence of violence or 
injustice enough for us?  Or should law and theories of law also provide for human 
flourishing and well-being?  This is a question of what the substantive norms of law 
and justice should be, and to what end states they should aspire.  Can law be a source 
of positive, life enhancing and flourishing values and obligations, or is law solely a 
source of prohibitions and negative obligations?  What processes of law making, 
interpretation and implementation are best suited to enhancing both legal and social 
justice? 
Legal philosophers5 have long queried whether law and legal institutions are 
necessarily coercive, needed most when “ordinary” human consent and voluntary 
compliance with (social) norms fails.  Do we turn to law to enforce legal norms 
because we know that moral or social norms are not adequate on their own?6  Who 
decides what those norms, laws, and enforcing institutions should say and do?  We 
speak of en-forcing law, signaling that law is a “force,” often brutal, requiring strength.  
The law acts “upon” someone who must be brought into compliance with the rules.  
Most often that “force” acts harshly with a focus on punishment and damages, binary 
judgments of right and wrong, and consequent liability, both civil and criminal, with 
some softening around the edges of comparative liability standards and some 
“negotiated” outcomes. 
In both substantive and process domains law is a statement of and means for 
policing, controlling, and demarcating what is permissible.  Most of the time the law 
tells us what we cannot do (e.g., kill, steal, infringe on the liberty of others, hurt other 
people, “be” negligent or reckless, break promises); it seldom tells us positively what 
we should do (e.g., be nice to other people, try to understand others and appreciate 
their own experiences, care for our families and others, be generous,7 share what we 
have with others, seek and promote justice and peace for others,8 as well as ourselves).  
                                                
5 See MINOW et al., supra note 1; SALLY ENGLE MERRY & NEAL MILNER, THE POSSIBILITY 
OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
3-30 (1993). 
6 The relationship of positive law to morality is an ongoing and still unresolved issue in 
jurisprudential debates; for some of the classic treatments see supra note 4.  
7 For an interesting take on how norms of generosity might work in different ways than our 
assumed notions of individual wealth maximization, see Lela Love & Sukhsimranjit Singh, 
Following the Golden Rule and Finding Gold: Generosity and Success in Negotiation, in EDUCATING 
NEGOTIATORS FOR A CONNECTED WORLD VOL. IV, RETHINKING NEGOTIATION 
PEDAGOGY SERIES (James Coben, et al. eds., 2012). 
8 For a recent argument that the century of “introspection” needs to be reoriented to think 
about others and “outropsection,” see Roman Krznaric, RSA Animate - The Power of 
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That is left for religion, ethics, and “proper” upbringing.  Increasingly, however, even 
legal scholars have begun to examine the incentives for “pro-social” or “norm-based” 
behavior in behavioral economics, law and psychology, socio-legal studies, and legal 
philosophy.9  
In recent years the theories, practices, law, and jurisprudence of non-violence,10 
peace,11 problem solving,12 restorative justice,13 peacemaking,14 and peace building 
and keeping15 have gained some, but not enough, ascendancy.  I will focus here on 
the way new processes of less violent or “brittle” ways of dealing with injustice16 may 
be better suited to modern multivalent instances of injustice—using a set of plural 
processes to ameliorate injustice in different ways, including mediation, restorative 
justice, transitional justice, 17  truth and reconciliation commissions, 18  consensus 
building initiatives,19 and other forms of legal problem solving and decision making.20 
If Cover enabled us to see the violence in legal categories and interpretation, it is now 
time (given the on-going violence in our world21) to focus on the non-violent (or “less-
violent”) possibilities in legal processes that seek to solve problems and reduce pain 
and injustice in multiple and different ways, without the rigid certainties of 
                                                                                                                           
Outrospection, YOUTUBE, (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.upworthy.com/why-the-self-help-
industry-is-an-enormous-failure.   
9 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GEORGIA ST. U. L. 
REV. 385 (1992); ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE (2011); see generally Law, Norms 
and Informal Order e-Journal, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, 
http://www.ssrn.com/link/law-norms-informal-order.html.  
10 COLMAN MCCARTHY, ALL OF ONE PEACE: ESSAYS ON NON-VIOLENCE (1994). 
11  CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX 
PACIFICATORIA (2008). 
12 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes, 
94 GEO. L.J. 553 (2006); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). 
13 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What is it and Does it Work?, 3 ANNUAL REV. OF 
LAW & SOC. SCI. 161 (2007). 
14 COLMAN MCCARTHY, I’D RATHER TEACH PEACE (2002). 
15 BUILDING PEACE: PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS FROM THE FIELD (2009); LISA SCHIRCH, 
THE LITTLE BOOK OF STRATEGIC PEACEBUILDING (Craig Zelizer & Robert A. Rubenstein 
eds., 2004). 
16 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13; Carrie Menkel-Meadow et al., Senses of Sen: 
Reflections on Amartya Sen’s ideas of justice, 8 INT’L J. OF LAW IN CONTEXT 155 (2012).  
17 RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000). 
18 PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE ATROCITY AND 
TERROR (2001). 
19 THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING 
AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999). 
20  SUSAN PODZIBA, CIVIC FUSION (2012); SUSAN CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, 
MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND 
CITIZEN’S GROUPS  (2001). 
21 See infra note 26. 
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“universal” values, processes and judgments.  Legal analysis and processes can include 
the “and,” as well as the “but,” as a famous gestalt therapist once taught me.22  Truth, 
justice and human needs can actually present many possibilities. 23  As I will suggest 
below, our humanity is both more advanced and more threatened than we commonly 
think.  It is time to conceive of and implement other ways of achieving justice in the 
world, through more peaceful and less violent means. 
When so much law and jurisprudence is framed to define and police the bad, 
punish wrongs, or create “negative” rights of liberty and separation between 
individuals and their governments, little law and jurisprudence seems available to 
theorize and more positive and life-affirming ways of being in the world. 24  
Nevertheless, some thinkers like Robin West have attempted to reframe jurisprudence 
studies to focus more on “normative jurisprudence”25 and the obligations of law and 
government to care for us and undertake “positive” obligations, such as keeping us 
safe, well fed, healthy, housed, educated, engaged in work or work substitutes, and 
connected to community and each other.26  Similarly, some newer constitutions27 
have attempted to state such social, economic and positive rights (aspirationally, if not 
totally realistically).  
My work has focused on developing legal and other processes that encourage the 
“best” in us to seek creative, less rigid, more contingent, and more tailored solutions 
to a wide variety of human problems that wind up in the legal system28 or become 
sources of serious human strife, hostility and war.  Since social psychologists have now 
clearly demonstrated that it is far easier to escalate a situation than to de-escalate it,29 
it seems imperative that we develop theories, strategies, and programs for 
encouraging (dare I say “incentivizing”?) obligations (laws?) and behaviors to de-
escalate conflicts and search for better and more peaceful solutions to a myriad of 
                                                
22 Thank you Janet Lederman (of the Esalen Institute). 
23 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With The Adversary System in a Post-Modern, Multi-
cultural World, 38 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996). 
24 For some exceptions, see Mari Matsuda, I and Thou and We and the Way to Peace, ISSUES 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP Art. 6 (Aug. 2002), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art6.  As more 
fully explored in the text infra, efforts to create a more “positive” jurisprudence can be traced 
to Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Mcfie eds., 1984) (1759) 
in which “sympathy” for others (or the more modern conceptions of “empathy”) is argued to 
be the single touchstone concept of justice, with “resentment of harm” to be the source of our 
conception of justice. Id. at 13). 
25 WEST, supra note 9.  
26 ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997). 
27 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (1996); VICKI JACKSON 
& MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2006) (exploring cases 
demonstrating interpretations of more “positive” rights in more recent constitutions, including 
the right to housing, education, healthcare, etc. in other non-American legal regimes). 
28 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in 
Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97 (2001). 
29 DEAN PRUITT & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE AND 
SETTLEMENT (1986). 
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human difficulties and  “injustices.”  This involves deeper engagement with 
differences while promoting the possibility of mutual understanding, empathy, 
sympathy, and “fellow-feeling.”  This approach opposes the conceptions of winners 
and losers, plaintiffs and defendants, and rights holders and deniers which 
characterize so much of our legal system. 
So, a project to create a “jurisprudence of peace, justice, and non-violence” should 
necessarily entail preventative measures, approaches to dealing with human 
difficulties and differences during conflicts and finally, more sensitive and tailored 
approaches to post-conflict resolutions30 I hope in this essay to spark an interest in a 
more positive jurisprudence of peace and non-violence.  I have many questions and 
few answers but I think we should be looking for ways to reconceptualize the study 
and practice of law to focus on these more positive approaches to human existence.  
Rather than preventing us from being bad, how can we encourage ourselves to be 
better human beings?  While some focus on religion, theology, ethics, or a new-age 
spirituality of love and appreciation of our fellow human beings,31 I think law in a 
more positive form has a role to play in the pursuit of peace and justice. 
II. Some Autobiographical Notes to Answer the Questions 
I begin with a few important autobiographical notes.  My German grandfather 
shot off part of his own finger to get out of front-line military service in the German 
army in World War I and became a pacifist (and promoter of Esperanto, in the hope 
that unifying the world with a single language would allow human beings to better 
understand each other and ensure peaceful co-existence).  He was part of the 
friedengeschellschaft (Association of Peace) “nie wieder Krieg” movement (Never Again 
War!).32  But then my pacifist, but political, paternal family escaped Nazi Germany 
and my father joined the American army to help defeat the Nazi monster.  (He was 
sent to Hawaii to make maps to fight the Japanese since the Americans feared he 
could still be sympathetic to the Germans—a ridiculous suspicion given that my 
father was half Jewish and attended Communist meetings in New York when that was 
still legal.33)  My father returned from Hawaii convinced that inter-marriage of all 
                                                
30 Indeed, one of the major problems with our “brittle” legal system is that convictions, 
verdicts, punishments, and judgments often result in a desire for revenge that continues 
conflicts. 
31 See, e.g., ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, THE LITTLE BOOK OF ATHEISTIC SPIRITUALITY 
(2008).  
32 See lithographs, sculptures, and etchings of Käthe Kollwitz, the War series, and her 
famous cry, “There has been enough of dying! Let not another man fall!" (after losing one of 
her sons in WWI). 
33 There remains a continuing question in my family about whether my father actually 
ever had a card membership or just attended Communist Party (“CP”) meetings in New York 
before the party was banned.  The company my father worked for all of his life in the United 
States as an engineer later made part of the plastic casing for the nuclear bomb and my 
father’s activities (he was not at the company at the time, but in the Pacific theatre himself) 
were not a security risk—remember in the 1940s the Soviets and the US were allies.  The CP 
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kinds was the future for peaceful co-existence in the world.  By mingling and mixing 
“pure” ethnic forms it would become impossible to hate in a purely ethnic way.  
Thus, the essence of my legal career was born from a pastiche of metaphors, ideas 
and realities—one language on earth, no “essence” of ethnicity or religion (from 
intermarriage), relativism in pacifism, preferring non-violence but prepared to fight 
against “systemic evil,” and appreciating the immigrant salad and hybrid identities of 
the United States, and the progressive expression of its founding values filtered 
through the teachings of European history and philosophy. 
As a young girl I was raised in the secular humanist religion of Ethical Culture,34 
which was noted for, among other things, its support of SANE (the anti-nuclear 
weapons movement, National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy) in the 1950s.  I 
demonstrated against the war in Viet Nam (at the first organized anti-war march in 
Central Park in 196535), became a political activist with Students for a Democratic 
Society and occupied a building at the Columbia University student protests of 1968 
(which had a seven-item list of demands, including dismantling the military-
industrialist establishment (first named by  President Dwight Eisenhower36) and then 
                                                                                                                           
and its members only became an issue in the McCarthy-era 1950s, and despite the Republican 
conservatism of the management of my father’s company, he was never fired and advanced to 
management himself (while maintaining a lifelong commitment to labor and the Democratic 
party).  I was a labor and employment lawyer in the early years of my practice. 
34 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now A Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality and the 
Practice of Justice and Conflict Resolution,, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1073 (2001). 
35 Which upset not my own family, who were proud of me, but many of my family’s 
German refugee friends –“How can you let your daughter protest against the country that 
took us in?” I remember my parents being asked when I returned soaked from the rainy 
protest.  I remember the arguments the protesters had with the “underreporting” of our 
numbers by the New York Times that day and I never quite trusted newspapers again. 
36  President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (January 17, 1961), in Public Papers 
of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at 1035- 1040, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8y06NSBBRtY (warning Americans about the dangers of 
a “permanent military establishment” and the dangers to our “liberties and democratic 
processes” if this “military-industrial complex” accrued too much “misplaced power.”). 
President Eisenhower warned about the change in America since an armament industry had 
become permanent (employing over 3 and a half million Americans) following World War II. 
He expressed concern about the political, economic and “spiritual” effects of this military 
establishment on America’s future and warned us to “guard against its misplaced influence.”  
If given today this speech would sound like a lefty peace plea, demonstrating how much more 
polarized we have become, even since the bi-polar Cold War years. Like many who leave 
office (including our own Presidents and Prime Ministers of many nations, in the UK and 
Israel, to name a few), Eisenhower’s message, after holding military and political office, was to 
seek and work for peace:  
Together we must learn to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and 
decent purpose . . . . We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have 
their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to 
enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; 
that those who have freedom will understand, also its heavy responsibilities; that all 
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by the protesters), ending the Viet Nam war, terminating “war research” at the 
university, and eliminating plans to build an exclusionary (racist) university 
gymnasium in our Harlem location).  
The Columbia student protests were profoundly formative for me.  At first we 
really thought we were making a revolution.  It was 1968 after all, and Danny the 
Red37 was already fomenting revolution in France.  Later there would be protests on 
other campuses, and Martin Luther King, Jr. and Bobby Kennedy would both be 
assasinated, as violence was used to fight violence on all sides.38  When I left my 
occupied building for a few days and heard the rumors the university was going to call 
the police on us, I joined a group of more pacifist students.  We divided up the 
campus and laid our bodies down on the ground outside to occupy, sleep, and, we 
hoped, prevent the police from stepping on us.  By “inter-mediating” and protecting 
our more radical colleagues still holding four buildings hostage from the university we 
tried to prevent the university from using violence.  Or so we thought.  The police 
were called by University President Grayson Kirk and they did more than step on us.  
They used billy clubs and worse.  Many students were hurt, bloodied, and arrested.39  
So, I was literally caught up in what later became my career of resistance, protests 
and struggles (and litigation), and at the same time, I felt the desire to “mediate” and 
calm things down.  I was horrified by the violence I saw that night and also by the 
failure of the largely “working class” police to see that we (mostly, but not all, middle 
class students) were fighting for “their” justice too.  When the tear gas cleared we 
regrouped and SDS, like many political action groups, splintered.  Part of SDS 
became more committed to violence (“you don’t need a weatherman to see which way 
the wind blows”40) and I quit.  For some of us, it was the beginning of our feminist 
consciousness and Columbia’s (and Barnard’s) “women’s liberation” movement was 
born out of the sexist behavior of our protests’ leaders.  Disputes about ideology and 
                                                                                                                           
who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of 
poverty, disease, and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that in 
the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the 
binding force of mutual respect and love. 
Id. 
37 Daniel Cohn-Bendit (known as Dany Le Rouge) was a student leader in the French 
student protests of 1968.  A German, he later became active in Green politics in Germany and 
France, serving in the European Parliament. 
38 See, e.g., TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1993). 
39 By a total fluke, I was not arrested and so I sit before you today as a fully admitted 
member of three state bars and an “establishment” law professor.  To this day, I advise 
students who have been arrested for political protests about what to do and say about their 
arrests on bar applications (disclose!). 
40 BOB DYLAN, SUBTERRANEAN HOMESICK BLUES (Columbia 1965).  Ironically, many of 
the more radical activists in the 1960s went on to pursue traditional careers in law, politics, 
and social change.  Bernadine Dohrn, a member of SDS’s Weatherman and a controversial 
political activist, later became a committed juvenile justice advocate and clinical professor at 
Northwestern Law School.  Tom Hayden, one of the founders of SDS, was a major legislator 
in California for many years.  We old time radicals are all more establishment now! 
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means for achieving social justice and the end of war then consumed the rest of my 
political education before I marched off to law school to become a poverty and civil 
rights lawyer. 
My early years as a poverty lawyer framed the rest of my practice and scholarly 
career.  Like many of my generation I brought class action lawsuits challenging prison 
conditions, school systems, welfare regulations, and discriminatory employment 
practices in both the public and private sector, all while maintaining a crushing (over 
300 cases at one time) load of individual cases involving evictions, unemployment 
compensation, family and custody disputes, collections, consumer cases, welfare 
denials, Social Security disability, and special education hearings.  We were evaluated 
by how big our cases were and what courts they were filed in.  No one then was able 
to measure the impact of these cases on actual people (though in my early years as a 
clinical professor there was much talk about doing this).41  I sat in my office and saw 
that even when we won (often easily through statutory and constitutional summary 
judgments) “the battle,” we would then lose “the war.”  Regulations would be 
changed, business would return to usual, another ground for welfare or Social 
Security denial would be “found” or manufactured.  Class actions changed or voided 
rules but they did not change lives often enough.  I watched as one very quiet lawyer 
in my office (later to become an administrative law judge in the Social Security 
system) conscientiously and diligently negotiated her cases on behalf of individuals, 
often, but not always, securing more long lasting, if more individualized, results for 
her clients.  Thus was born my desire to learn, and then teach, other forms of 
attaining justice – negotiation, later mediation and “alternative” (now appropriate) 
dispute resolution and even later, group and community facilitation, and deliberative 
democracy.42 
III. Process Pluralism or Justice Without War or Litigation? 
As one of the founders of the “ADR” movement in American law (along with 
Frank Sander of the Harvard faculty and others), I have focused my work as a 
                                                
41 See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and 
Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978); I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal 
Services, J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180453.  
See also Scott Cummings, Empirical Studies of Law and Social Change: What is the Field? What are the 
Questions?, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 171 (2013). 
42 For modern texts on facilitating deliberative democracy through dispute resolution 
processes see, e.g., SUSAN L. PODZIBA, CIVIC FUSION: MEDIATING POLARIZED PUBLIC 
DISPUTES (2012); CAROLYN J. LUKENSMEYER, BRINGING CITIZEN VOICES TO THE TABLE 
(2013); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, SARAH MCKEARNAN & JENNIFER THOMAS-LARMER, THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 
(1999), and LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L. CRUICKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S 
RULES: THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS  
(2006); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 
(2005). 
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theorist, teacher and practitioner or “pracademic”43 on other forms of justice seeking 
besides (in addition to, not totally supplanting of) litigation.44  As a poverty and civil 
rights lawyer I observed how winning a case might make a new precedent or void an 
unjust law, but would not always change lives.  
One of my favorite cases was a race discrimination class action against a trucking 
company that assigned whites the more lucrative “over-the-road” hauls, while black 
drivers were assigned to inner-city driving with more difficult conditions, less mileage 
and lower wages.  My clients wanted better jobs and higher wages, not a many year 
fight in federal court to have this discriminatory practice declared illegal (as it had in a 
number of other jurisdictions45).  During this case I learned the art of negotiation by 
settling with the trucking company for new trucks to be delivered to the named 
plaintiff to create his own trucking company.  This did not immediately end 
discrimination in the trucking industry but my clients felt empowered.  Through cases 
like this I learned, early in my legal career, the power of creative problem solving in 
negotiation.  
No court would have been empowered to order the results we achieved through 
negotiation. Litigation, with its focus on the fact-specific past, and its “limited 
remedial imagination” as I later argued in one of my first law review articles46, was 
too “brittle” or rigid and backward focused, for future-oriented problem solving and 
the particular kind of (more immediate) “justice” my clients desired.  My clients 
wanted to separate from their discriminatory bosses; others might have preferred to 
stay with a lawsuit for a longer legal “haul.”  I learned that not all clients wanted the 
same thing and too many “cause” lawyers47 were more focused on their own political 
agendas than their clients’ desires and well being.  This tension between law reform 
lawyering and client service remains an ongoing challenge for social justice lawyers 
and legal clinicians, but it taught me there was a need for many different ways of 
pursuing legal justice, both in terms of process pluralism (different kinds of process) 
and in terms of more varied fact-based, client-tailored “solutions” to different legal 
problems.   
The avoidance of the labels “winners” and “losers” in litigation, where possible, 
also can end the conflict more amicably and prevent the resentment and desire for 
                                                
43 Maria Volpe & David Chandler, Resolving and Managing Conflicts in Academic Communities: 
The Emerging Role of the ‘Pracademic,’ 17 NEGOT. J. 245 (2001). 
44 CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA LOVE, ANDREA SCHNEIDER & JEAN STERNLIGHT, 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2d ed. 2011); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, When Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus Building and Mediation As Public Interest 
Lawyering, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37 (2002). 
45 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and the National Labor Relations 
Act: A New Role for the NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 158 (1974). 
46  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of 
Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L.  REV. 754 (1984). 
47 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward An Understanding of the 
Motivations and Commitments of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold 
eds., 1998). 
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revenge that often follows losses.  Though I never use the phrase “win-win” (which 
inaccurately promises too much in most conflicts), at least some forms of dispute 
resolution result in better than “win-lose” outcomes and can prevent the “loser” from 
seeking to avenge a loss through further conflict or violence.  Though many people 
continue to criticize negotiated settlements as unprincipled compromise, for me, 
“principled” negotiation 48  in fact acknowledges the engagement of parties to 
apprehend each other’s realities and attempt to “meet” in a place where needs and 
interests on both or all sides can be met.49 
With a focus on negotiation, mediation, facilitation of complex multiparty disputes 
and other hybrid forms of dispute resolution domestically, we now see many forms of 
formal, informal and “semi-formal” dispute resolution designed to develop less brittle 
(win-lose) outcomes, out of processes that empower parties and permit them to 
participate in the tailored resolution of their own disputes.50  Mediational approaches 
permit parties to participate in making solutions  that might be more long-lasting, 
consensual, tailored to their own needs, contingent and re-visitable, and less likely to 
lead to desires for revenge, as losing often does.  Giving parties greater control of how 
they confront those they are in conflict with and encouraging more possibilities of 
resolution, including reconciliation, as well as restitution, responsibility and 
accountability, for example, may itself lead to more peaceful, robust and enduring 
outcomes.  These are the claims of process pluralism and “appropriate” dispute 
resolution for a more diversified sense of justice, where agreement on the “universal” 
substantive good may be more difficult to achieve.51 
As domestic dispute resolution processes have proliferated, a similar process 
pluralism has also developed in the international arena.  Human “rights,” like the 
American civil “rights” described above, began with strong claims of “rights” 
(freedom, self-determination, no discrimination, no killing, murder, no rape, etc.) 
which,  by definition also define and describe the “wrongs” committed by some 
people, against others.  Those “wrongdoers” are now prosecuted and punished (not 
always) with models based on trials and adjudication, from the Nuremberg trials, as 
our civil rights violations are addressed in courts (in both criminal and civil contexts).  
However, in the international arena, with the greater recognition of occurrences and 
definitions of human rights,52 there has also been the development of more and varied 
international tribunals to adjudicate, and treat in other ways, the expansion of both 
state- to-state and individual and organizational claims in a time of “transnational” 
                                                
48 ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES; NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (3d ed. 2011). 
49 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Compromise, Negotiation and Morality, 26 NEGOT. J. 483 (2010); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Negotiate or Not to Negotiate? That is the Question: The Ethics of 
Compromise in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELD GUIDE: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE 
EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR (Andrea Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006). 
50 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Formal, Informal and Semi-Formal Justice in the United States, in 
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE (D. Malesin ed., 2012). 
51 STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000). 
52 LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS (2008). 
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interactions. The arenas and processes by which new kinds of claims can be made and 
either adjudicated or handled in some other manner has increased exponentially.53  In 
times of great violence we can now turn to specialized tribunals for prosecution, first 
developed at Nuremberg, now the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda, or the International Criminal Court54 or turn instead to a 
variety of Truth and Reconciliation processes or hybrid international, supra-national 
or domestic courts or other institutions for criminal, civil and hybrid legal treatment.55  
These new institutions and processes provide the opportunity to explore different 
theories of justice and jurisprudence, with different purposes (retribution, punishment, 
reconciliation, forgiveness, restitution, history making, truth finding, and 
compensation), different goals and outcomes (apologies, compensation, documentation, 
restitution, reintegration, reconciliation, as well as or in lieu of conviction and 
imprisonment, shaming56) and different processes, procedures and forms of participation.  
Already a series of important jurisprudential and ethical questions have developed 
around these new institutions, stemming from our increased sensitivity to and 
confrontation with the violence of the past (e.g., Holocaust) and present (war crimes, 
genocides and civil wars).  For peace and justice to be achieved, what is the 
relationship of the past to the present and future?  What must be remembered?57  
What can be forgiven, and by whom?  When must there be punishment, and for what 
purposes (deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, vengeance)?  Who should decide 
how grievous wrongs should be dealt with?  What is the role of the (violent) past in 
creating (the more peaceful/just) future?58  Can there be peace without justice?  Can 
there be justice without peace?  Must only law, principle and rule be used to achieve 
justice or is it (and when is it) permissible to use something other than legal principle 
to resolve, terminate or even just “handle” violence?  When are cease-fires, peace, 
                                                
53  J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (5th ed. 2011); 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Duncan French, Mathew Saul & Nigel D. 
White eds,, 2010); Andrea Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute System Design and Transitional 
Justice,  14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 289 (2009). 
54 The U.S. is not a ratified party to the International Criminal Court, but is proceeding 
with prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  See The Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9. 
55 See, e.g., ACCOUNTING FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
(Jane Stromseth ed., 2003); JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN 
MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTION 
(2006). 
56 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989). 
57 On the ethics of memory, see AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY (2002); 
EVA HOFFMAN, AFTER SUCH KNOWLEDGE: MEMORY HISTORY AND THE LEGACY OF THE 
HOLOCAUST (2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past 
to Future in Pursuing Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97 (2004): Susan 
Coutin, Re/Membering the Nation: Gaps and Reckoning within Biographical Accounts of Salvadoran 
Émigrés, 84 ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 809 (2011). 
58 See, e.g., Yxta Maya Murray, From Here I Saw What Happened and I Cried: Carrie Mae Weems’ 
Challenge to the Harvard Archive, this issue.   
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compromise, temporary agreements justified?  An enormous outpouring of useful 
scholarship and practice has developed around these issues of permissible and 
impermissible compromise in outcome59 and process,60 as scholars are now evaluating 
and studying how the variety of efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping are nested 
in a widely diverse set of conflicts.61 
I have been a student, practitioner and promoter of “process pluralism” as we 
attempt to design new structures, processes and institutions to develop creative, 
flexible and suitable-to-context means for resolving and managing past violence and 
conflict in order to create a more peaceful and just future.62  The questions presented 
by using different processes for different purposes include: 
• whether processes themselves can encourage different forms of peace seeking,  
and problem solving, before, during or after particular conflicts; 
• whether substantive legal, moral, political or philosophical commitments are necessary to 
promote more peaceful means of engagement; 
• what forms of formal enforcement or institutionalization of such processes and 
substantive commitments might be necessary to make them a reality. 
The UN Charter, for example, specifies that it was created in the hope that its 
member signatories could “practice tolerance and live together in peace with one 
another as good neighbors and to unite in strength to maintain international peace 
and security.”63  Article 33 provides that a “party to any dispute, the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, 
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice and the Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, 
call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means,” but these non-enforcing 
provisions are hardly  “mandatory” assignments to ADR, as practiced by many courts 
                                                
59 AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES (2010); ROBERT 
E. GOODIN ON SETTLING (2012); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Compromise, Negotiation and Morality, 
26 NEGOT. J. 483 (2010); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Variable Morality of Constitutional (and 
Other) Compromises: A Comment on Sanford Levinson’s Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. 
REV. 903 (2011). 
60 ROBERT MNOOKIN, BARGAINING WITH THE DEVIL? WHEN TO NEGOTIATE, WHEN TO 
FIGHT (2010). 
61 See, e.g., GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED 
RIVALRIES (2007); ANTONIA CHAYES & MARTHA MINOW, IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: 
RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICT  (2003); BELL, supra note 11. 
62 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What 
We Should (Not) Do About It: Lessons From International and Domestic Fronts, 14  HARV. NEG. L. REV.  
195 (2009); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic 
Conflict Resolution: Lessons From General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 319 
(2003). 
63 UN Charter, pmbl..  
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in the United States (and now other parts of the world).64  While the UN has 
sponsored both official and second-track or more informal and private dispute 
resolution efforts, and many “notables” have offered their services to intervene in 
international disputes (former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton in North 
Korea; Tony Blair, George Mitchell and Henry Kissinger in the Middle East), there is 
little formal mechanism for the more stringent pursuit of peaceful means. Legal 
disputes, according to Article 36, “should, as a general rule, be referred to the 
International Court of Justice,” (which is a court of generally voluntary and consent-
based jurisdiction of disputes between legal states).65  As any international law student 
knows, actions by the Security Council require concurrence of all permanent 
members (including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and 
China)66 and so formal actions have been quite limited in the UN’s history, though 
they have included resolutions and actions for formal economic sanctions, as well as 
peacekeeping and more formal actions in some settings.67 
Since UN action has been relatively limited, these new institutions have developed 
to deal with conflict, both within and between nation-states, in different ways.  
Modern international scholars are now engaged in efforts to evaluate and assess 
whether there is any general learning or conclusions to be drawn about when and 
how different processes might be appropriate for different kinds of conflict.  To the 
extent that punishment of evil doers is one goal that many regard as fundamental, 
while others worry about worsening conflict in post-conflict societies without more 
capacity building and reconciliation efforts, process pluralism might be required to 
punish and then heal conflict and violence, even within the same society (e.g., current 
efforts in Cambodia).68  
 So, one major question for domestic, national, and international legal regimes 
is whether we as human beings, and the institutions we create, can encourage, if not 
require, more effective, alternative, positive, peace seeking processes at the same time 
that we often still cleave to older notions of wrongdoing with punishment, and 
meeting violence and conflict with more violence and conflict. 
                                                
64 BRYAN CLARK, LAWYERS AND MEDIATION (2012). 
65 Statute of the International Court of Justice art 34, 36, 37, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055. 
66 UN Charter art. 23. 
67 Security Council actions were quite rare during the Cold War with effective vetoes by 
either the US or the Soviet Union or China, then increased for some interventions in Eastern 
Europe and Africa after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and more recently have been more 
difficult again in such conflicts as Syria, where alliances of the permanent members with other 
nations in conflict prevent the needed votes for authorizing actions. Without rehearsing all of 
the considerable scholarship, media commentary, and political analysis of formal actions of the 
UN and global powers in general, suffice it to say here that world government has been 
controversially inadequate to the task of applying many peaceful processes to deal with many 
modern post WWII conflicts. 
68 For efforts to describe and evaluate such different processes see STROMSETH, WIPPMAN 
& BROOKS, supra note 55. 
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IV.  Are Humans Hard or Soft-Wired for War or Peace? 
 As we contemplate the possibilities of different modes of responses and 
processes to human violence and conflict it may be instructive to review some of the 
continuing debates about where our human behavior comes from.  Since the 
beginning of political philosophy theorists have debated the nature of human nature. 
Are men69 basically evil, and life “brutish and short,”70 unless we make social and 
political contracts with each other and a state to bind ourselves with promises to 
regulate (if not suppress) our inherent selfishness, resource maximization and 
competition with each other?71  Or, when educated, socialized72 or politicized73 to 
realize our common nature and need for each other to prosper, will men (and women) 
join together to shed their differences and shackles and create a world for the 
common good?  Can we learn to sympathize or empathize with others, different from 
ourselves, the human source of “pleasure in mutual sympathy?”74  Is there such a 
thing as a single or universalizable “human nature?”  With the additions of empirical 
                                                
69 In this context I use “men” deliberately, since so much of the political philosophy on the 
origins of human political action assumes men are the primary, if not sole, actors.  For more 
recent feminist political philosophy on the origins of the social and political contract, see 
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988) (suggesting that women have been 
assigned different (family and caretaking roles) in this initial, and “fictional” period of social 
contracting).  In even more controversial work in recent periods of feminist scholarship, some 
feminist theorists have suggested that if women were more seriously considered in these 
speculations about the origins and sources of human nature we might have a more nuanced, 
more “caring” perspective on the “essential” nature of “personhood.”  See, e.g., NEL 
NODDINGS, CARING (1984); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982); WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (Eva Feder 
Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987).  Though I have often been considered an “essentialist” 
in this debate, my own view is more nuanced about the “origins” of gendered and human 
behavior—socialization, education, and context matter enormously, but so should there be 
“inclusion” of more variegated theories of human “nature,” “nurture,” and interactions.  See, 
e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process, 
1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at 
Gender, Feminism and Legal Ethics, in LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL PRACTICE: CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES (S. Parker & C. Sampford eds., 1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women in Dispute 
Resolution: Parties, Lawyers and Dispute Resolvers–What Difference Does ‘Gender Difference’ Make?,  
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAG., April 2012). 
70 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J. Plamenatz ed. 1963) (1651). 
71 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988). 
72 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Charles Frankel trans., Hafner 
Pub. Co. 1947) (1762); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE, OR ON EDUCATION (Allan Bloom 
trans., Basic Books 1979) (1762). 
73 FRIEDERICH ENGELS & KARL MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Joseph Katz ed., 
Samuel Moore trans., Washington Square Press 1964) (1848). 
74 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie, 
eds., 1984) (1759). 
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social and developmental psychology to the more abstract musings about human 
nature, more modern treatments of the nature of man have recognized that human 
beings are more complicated than a single reductionist conception of the individual or 
group, let alone all of humankind.  Individuals are “made” not just born, to 
paraphrase Simone De Beauvoir’s observation about gender, 75  and thus social 
learning and construction of the individual depends on both situations (both the 
material and non-material conditions of social learning) and personal and 
interpersonal psychological development as more modern theories of human 
development now tell us.76  
As modern developmental, social and cognitive psychology have made more 
complex the story of how the individual becomes a person, with emotions, language, 
morality and preferences, so too has the sociological story of how and why groups are 
made, formed, and conduct their work and survive or disintegrate, including how 
groups interact with each other, become more complex over time.  Based on modern 
empirical study, we now know that not all groups behave in the same way, and 
situations and circumstances can mark, transform and change how groups interact 
with each other.77  Just as we try to understand and “intervene” in cell biology as a 
result of modern cancer research, one might consider how social and other 
interventions now alter the structure and functions and “sociology” of groups, and the 
psychology of individuals.  Thus, I have often been skeptical about whether there is 
an essential knowable and unchangeable human nature of competition, self-interest 
and preservation of only kin. 78  Though political philosophers often opine and 
describe from places of overly general abstractions, more modern approaches to 
behaviorism attempt more empirically based, nuanced, and “plastic” conceptions of 
human behavior that seem to allow for both more “agency,” as well as more complex 
understandings of the constraints on human behavior (e.g., geography and biology79). 
 In a recent effort to combine new studies and knowledge of human, animal 
and technical “behavior,” futurist Jeremy Rifkin has argued that the story of human 
development is one of ever transforming (through material and non-material change) 
consciousness.80  What the caveman needed to know to survive (hunt, kill and later 
gather and cook), was succeeded by what the serf needed to know to farm land (and 
pray to various religions and belief systems for rain and good soil), then succeeded by 
                                                
75 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1949). 
76 See, e.g., D.W. WINNICOTT, HUMAN NATURE (1988); JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF 
THE CHILD (1982). 
77 See, e.g., IRVING JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS 
AND FIASCOS (2nd ed. 1982); Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: When Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
Yale L.J. 71 (2000); LEE ROSS & RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 
(1991).  
78 See also RICHARD SENNETT, TOGETHER: THE RITUALS, PLEASURES AND POLITICS OF 
COOPERATION (2012). 
79 JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES (2005). 
80  JEREMY RIFKIN, THE EMPATHIC CIVILIZATION: THE RACE TO GLOBAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN A WORLD IN CRISIS (2009). 
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freethinking, human mobility (navigation, construction, language) and commerce, 
and now technology and mass communication.  Changes in our human geography, 
family and work structures, and mastery over nature,81 if not yet over disease and 
poverty, have changed what we need to know in order to survive, and what we do 
know and create with that knowledge is historically contingent.  For Rifkin, such 
transformations, regardless of their sources, have produced an alteration of human 
consciousness in favor of the recognition of the necessity of interdependence, rather than 
a more brutish and competitive sense of survival.  Whether one agrees with this 
“transformation” story or not, it provides a more optimistic narrative of how we 
might conceive of socialized human (if not essentialized) behavior. 82 
Most importantly to Rifkin, and to me, is that, like the child who becomes 
conscious of himself and can articulate needs at about age 18 months (recognition in 
the mirror while also recognizing the difference between self and other) and then 
understand ideas and concepts between age 2 and 3, human beings have become 
conscious of their own consciousness.  For some, but not all of us, we come to 
recognize the ability to transform that consciousness, not only through material 
conditions but also through education, social interaction, and the situations we 
encounter.  Not unlike Adam Smith’s complex “impartial spectator”83, we have come 
to judge ourselves by seeing how others might view us –we are conscious of both 
public opinion and how that public opinion influences our own sense of ourselves.  
The nature versus nurture debate is now clearly nature and nurture for the individual – 
so it is likely to be in human group development as well.  We are not all the same 
throughout human history, regardless of what your views of human nature might be.  
As scientists study, document, and change their views of the stages of human 
development, so have sociologists, anthropologists and historians documented that the 
very nature of “man” and human consciousness has also evolved over time (and place 
and space, as well).  And the more optimistic philosophers and ethicists among us, like 
Smith and Rifkin, would argue that our consciousness which recognizes our need for 
others also should encourage us to interact more favorably with others and to judge 
ourselves (adversely) when we do not. 
Rather than the distorted (through social Darwinist Herbert Spencer) ideas about 
“survival of the fittest” competition among human groups,84 Rifkin argues that our 
modern consciousness will lead us to empathize with others, perhaps only out of 
necessity, but still we will focus on our need for others, as well as self, in order to 
survive.  He argues that as we come to apprehend the potential death of the planet, 
through climate change, overpopulation, threat of nuclear war and other possible 
                                                
81 Sometimes! Clearly tsunamis, earthquakes, and hurricanes demonstrate that man has 
not fully mastered his environment, though we continue to seek methods of prediction, 
prevention, preparation, and then, if necessary, recuperation. 
82  For an amusing and condensed visualization of a 600 page argument about our 
expanding global consciousness see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7AWnfFRc7g&feature=youtu.be.  
83 SMITH, supra note 74 at 9-10, 16. 
84 Herbert Spencer, Principles of Biology (Univ. Press of the Pac. 2002) (1864). 
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catastrophes (as we come to understand our individual mortality), we will be 
“encouraged” (or “forced”) to build new ideas, behaviors and institutions to build an 
“empathic civilization” for our survival.  In his view, not only do we have the capacity 
to do this; we must do so.  If we need each other in order to (cooperate) to survive, we 
will, by necessity have to create, support and empower the processes and institutions 
that will make more peaceful coordination of human activity possible.85  
Thus, Rifkin’s “global consciousness” story feeds into my hopes for an institutional 
design project to produce more collaborative and less violent modes of human 
interaction.  Evidence that these projects are already being undertaken can be seen in 
the formal institutional coordination of global health, aviation, anti-terrorism, and 
other “transnational” activities that have spawned both formal and informal 
“networks” of transsystemic legal activity.86  The impulse to reach across legal systems 
to create formal (and informal) mechanisms for collaborative and coordinated human 
behavior can be seen as early instantiation of a realization for the necessity of a 
jurisprudence of peaceful, non-violent, mutually sustaining activity, often based on 
legal concepts, processes and institutions. 
For Rifkin (and for me), necessity should be the mother (and father) of invention 
for continued existence.  Using recent research on “mirror neurons” developed while 
watching monkeys then other mammals react to each other by mirroring behaviors 
and feelings when observing other “like” creatures, Rifkin argues that we are “wired” 
(whether “hard” in our neuron paths or “soft” in our learned responses) to feel our 
fellow beings’ plights (the “fellow-feeling” described by many moral philosophers, 
starting with Adam Smith).  Coupled with an argument that, at about age 8, children 
begin to understand the concepts of their own and other’s mortality, Rifkin argues 
that human beings who learn about their own mortality will empathize with others 
and develop human understanding out of our mutually recognized fates.  By further 
extending his argument to recount the evidence we now have about the possible 
mortality of the planet, Rifkin argues that human beings must (inevitably) develop a 
“global empathic consciousness” if we and our planet are to survive.  Rifkin’s 
argument suggests that both as individuals and as groups we need to gather and learn 
from the (scientific) information now generated about our mutual fates, and then to 
figure out how to use that information to engage in productive survival problem 
solving.  While our current world (at least Rifkin’s and my own secular humanist 
approach) substitutes a “scientific” story for an older, more religious one87, (based on 
“facts” about the state of the physical world), there is a spiritual and moral theme here 
                                                
85 This is, after all, similar to Adam Smith’s joint philosophical project of The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments  and The Wealth of Nations (1776) where morality, conscience, and an 
efficient, as well as peaceful, world order comes from sympathetic, as well as self-interested 
economic, relationships. 
86 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005) (describing both formal and 
informal transnational networks of “global governance”). 
87 Virtually all religions have some version of the “do unto others as you would have others 
do unto you” maxim, which preaches some empathy or at least instrumental or self-interested 
altruism. 
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as well.  Instrumentally we need others to cooperate in the survival project, but 
morally we should recognize we can flourish only if others do as well.  A 
jurisprudence of non-violence and recognition of the fates of others, as tied to our 
own, may facilitate the development of concrete institutions to further these 
instrumental and spiritual ideas (the human necessity of interdependence, 
coordination and collaboration). 
Much in the summary above is contested in rigorous evolutionary, biological, 
religious, political, psychological, and sociological theory and history, as well as in 
both the human and physical sciences, but whether the whole story is persuasive to 
you or not, Rifkin and the evolutionary biologists who have been studying genetic 
predispositions to cooperative versus competitive behavior,88 would argue that it is at 
least as likely that we are “wired” for sociability as competition.  The somewhat 
bloodied but persistent existence of the human race is evidence enough of that fact.89 
 So, whatever your views about the “nature” of human nature, my own are 
that human nature is more complex than the simple origin stories of political 
philosophy and that our human natures are in fact, more “plastic”90 and capable of 
being transformed by will, circumstances, and education. 
 Thus, as Rifkin (and others) recount our ever-changing history of human 
consciousness, the theories upon which our laws and jurisprudence are built might 
also be subject to transformation and change as we become conscious of both their 
underlying abstract claims and their unrealized realities on the ground.  As our 
knowledge bases, consciousnesses and situations change, so have our conceptions of 
justice changed over time.  Indeed, so many major shifts in human history have been 
accompanied by or instigated by legal transformations (e.g., the Reformation, the 
Enlightenment and the political and legal revolutions it produced, the two World 
Wars and the international legal order produced thereafter, and the post-colonial 
period).  Thus, if we are in a “new” period of “global consciousness” we will need a 
new jurisprudence of peace and non-violence to help us create and structure the 
human interactions we will need to insure our survival and human flourishing.  Here 
the question is: can we marry old conceptions of determining what is “right” or 
“wrong” (justice) with what it might take to forge more complex, diversified and 
contingent relationships with others for mutual cooperation and co-existence (peace)? 
 
 
                                                
88  See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION 
AND COOPERATION (1997). 
89 Though as my insightful editor, Max Utzschneider, points out, Social Darwinists might 
claim that we (at least some of us) have survived precisely because it is the victors of the 
competitions who are still here.  I protest this notion because so many of us “weaker” humans 
are still here, both in terms of less advantaged groups, as well as particular individuals. 
90 ROBERTO UNGER, POLITICS, PLASTICITY INTO POWER 3 (1987). 
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V. Evolving Notions of Justice and Peace 
 As notions of justice are variable and temporally specific (distributive, 
equitable, retributive, restitutionary, restorative) so has the relationship of justice to 
“peace” been an ongoing and variably contested notion.91  Following World War II 
and the establishment of the Nuremberg Trials, with their contested assessments as 
“victor’s justice” and “retroactive” criminal law,92 newer models of legal actions for 
“transitional justice” and restorative justice have been added to our legal repertoire, 
in addition to the prosecutorial model of the International Criminal Court and the 
International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  This proliferation of 
other modes of legal and quasi-legal forms, in the form of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions, hybrid international and national courts, and indigenous processes,93 
represent an effort to recognize that “healing,” apology, and coming together to make 
peace and create new societies and institutions for reconciliation94 may be just as 
important as prosecution and punishment.  
Even under the most horrific conditions of civil war, genocide, and post-
independence and revolutionary wars, many seeking justice now recognize that, if a 
new order is to be fashioned after great conflict, it may be important to create 
different approaches to post-conflict co-existence and peaceful relations.  From the 
first modern Truth and Reconciliation Commission (not in South Africa as is 
commonly thought, but Bolivia95), each new emergence from conflict has produced 
an iterative process of “truth” finding, reconciliation, restitution, new narrative 
creation, and in some cases punishment and lustration. 96   The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) in Chile was more private (though records of 
human rights violations were meticulously kept by the Jesuits97).  The Argentine TRC 
                                                
91 See Menkel-Meadow, supra notes 3 and 44. 
92 Justifications in the nascent international criminal law of the time were that the war 
crimes and crimes of genocide were clear violations of international customary law and 
legitimated by the treaties and statutes that formed the basis for the Nuremberg prosecutions. 
Theodor Meron & Jean Galbraith, Nuremberg and Its Legacy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 
(John Noyes et al. eds., 2007). 
93 See,.e.g., Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, J. 
DISP. RES. 355 (2004); Catherine Honeyman et al., Establishing Collective Norms: Potentials for 
Participatory Justice in Rwanda, 10 PEACE & CONFLICT J. OF THE AM. PSYCH. ASSOC. 1 (2004). 
94 ERIN DALY & JEREMY SARKIN, RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES (2007). 
95 HAYNER, supra note 18; Kevin Avruch & B. Vejarano, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: 
A Review Essay and Annotated Bibliography, 1 SOC. JUSTICE, ANTHROPOLOGY, PEACE AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 47 (2001). 
96 For a slightly fuller discussion of these cultural variations on truth and reconciliation 
processes see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 57 at 221-28. 
97 Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1425 (1992).  See also 
ARIEL DORFMAN, DEATH AND THE MAIDEN (1991) (fictionalized theatrical account of Chile’s 
and other South American countries’ human rights commissions following the collapse of 
military dictatorships). 
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process was more public and produced a best-selling report,98 still available on 
newsstands today99 (including documentation of torture.  Lastly, the South African 
TRC (though criticized for many things), was televised and has had some 
demonstrable effects on the development of a human rights consciousness in post-
Apartheid South Africa.100  These new institutions and processes have not all been 
successful in the same way, but neither has prosecution always succeeded.101  In some 
of the TRC processes, the emphasis has been on “truth,” or telling families what has 
happened to their loved ones.  In others, the emphasis has been on creating new 
national narratives and “truth” for the larger society.  Still others have focused on 
“moving forward toward reconciliation” (with amnesties, lustration and other devices 
to move quickly to a new legal and political order).  By contrast, in South Africa, 
nationally televised proceedings were intended to educate even those who felt 
“uninvolved” in or even denied the injustices of apartheid.  At least these new 
processes and institutions are trying “another way,” dedicated to reconciliation, 
healing, restorative justice and a broader moral conception of dealing with injustice 
and violence: 
The reconciliation commissions and restorative justice programs are a formal 
recognition that the question of morality extends beyond the issue of fairness to include 
the equally important issue of caring and that righting a wrong includes emotional 
reparations as well as criminal convictions.  These novel legal entities are a new way of 
dealing with conflict resolution that puts as much emphasis on empathy as on equity. 
Such bodies would have been unheard of in previous periods of history.  Their success 
in mitigating future abuses and criminal behavior, while mixed, is nonetheless 
                                                
98 THE NAT’L COMM’N ON THE DISAPPEARED (CONADEP), NUNCA MÁS! INFORME DE 
LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICIÓN DE PERSONAS (8th ed. 2006).  See also 
Carlos Santiago Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of 
Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619 (1991); Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute 
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1990-91). 
99 And Argentina, like other sites of human atrocities, has begun to develop museums and 
educational programs to commemorate the sites of evil.  For example, see the Escuela de 
Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA), a Naval Military School in Buenos Aires with a prison on 
site at the naval mechanical school in the center of the city.  
100 JAMES GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED 
NATION (2004). 
101 Most recently the Appellate Chamber of the Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia has acquitted and reversed judgment on two Croatian defendants (Gotovina and 
Markac) after expensive criminal trials where the two were tried and convicted of crimes 
against humanity for actions taken in removal of Serbs in Croatia in 1995 (Nov. 16, 2012, 
Appellate Chamber, ICTY).  To date, of the more than 160 indicted in the ICTFY, 130 have 
been brought to trial. Many criticize these criminal prosecutions as being one-sided and are 
heavily discounted and politicized in post-conflict politics “back home.”  The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is in The Hague and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda is in Arusha, Tanzania. 
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encouraging and suggests a broadening of the vision of criminal justice and the role of 
law in addressing wrongdoing in society.102  
 The issue of the proper response to outrageous acts of violence has been with 
us since the beginning of humankind.  Whether one adheres to what we (westerners) 
now regard as the more primitive “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” form of 
“equitable revenge” or the more generous Christian principle of “turning the other 
cheek,” there has been no successful single universally acceptable reaction to violence 
and evil-doing in others.  Neither have we fully figured out how to prevent violence 
among our own (whether kin, countrymen or even allies), not to mention the less 
lethal but disturbing ways in which we engage in conflict and even everyday 
interaction with others in competitive and hostile environments.  Calls for civility in 
litigation and lawyering behavior are legion now, but these appeals co-exist with a 
culture based on violent sports competitions (e.g., American football and hockey) and 
now, in our case, an almost continuous state of war somewhere in the world (Persian 
Gulf, Afghanistan, Iraq and  the more subtle but insidious “War on Terror”).  Even 
the important anti-poverty program I participated in in the 1960’s was the “’War’ on 
Poverty.”  As many others have described,103 the words, metaphors and images we 
use to describe our actions, reveal a culture based on conflict, competition and 
violence: “let’s go to the mat on that,”  “we sure killed them on that issue,”  “we cut 
them off at the knees,” “we shot down that argument,” “we won that battle,” rather 
than one built on justice or gentleness toward others in pain or need.  If we are to seek 
peace and less violent forms of justice our language, metaphors, social commitments, 
and larger legal culture will have to reflect a different set of values, as well as 
institutional forms.  In the final two sections I outline some thoughts about how such 
an articulation of values and developments of new forms might begin, as well as 
noting some of the on-going challenges such a project must face. 
VI. Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Peace 
 In my view, what is needed for a jurisprudence of peace and non-violence is 
nothing short of a reconfiguring of what law is for—how it should be created, 
enforced, and studied.  At the level of substantive norms, what would it take to 
imagine the creation of more “positive” entitlements to a sufficiently meaningful and 
fulfilling life,104 so at least some forms of violence might be eliminated?  For those who 
attribute “structural violence” to continued inequalities of life situations and the social 
                                                
102 RIFKIN, supra note 80 at 16-17. 
103 Elizabeth Thornberg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports and Sex Shape the 
Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225 (1995).  See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4 and 10.  
104 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, 
CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); and JOHN RAWLS, 
THE LAW OF PEOPLES (2001) for contrasting efforts to elucidate different jurisprudential ideas 
of “world justice” from measures of human development and empowered human capabilities, 
to basic jurisprudential and human rights principles (freedoms) for both liberal and non-liberal 
political orders. 
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institutions that enable them, legal expressions for the more “material” rights to 
health, work, education, and a safe environment, as is common, if not yet enforced, in 
modern Constitutions, would be an important addition to our currently configured 
less tangible rights to “liberty” (usually from the interference of government, as well as 
each other).  In modern constitutional jurisprudence, this is the difference between 
“primary” (or “negative”) rights and freedoms (civil and political), “secondary” or 
“positive” rights to social and economic entitlements and justice, and “tertiary” 
conceptions of group and cultural rights.105 
In addition to a reconfiguration of legal rights and entitlements, what would it take 
to imagine a conception of law and justice that insists upon more than tolerance, but 
appreciation for difference, for recognition of our humanity, for care and rescue of 
those in need,106 and for healing and reintegrative or rehabilitative processes for other 
human beings?  Many years ago I hoped that an “ethic of care” (derived from Carol 
Gilligan’s work In A Different Voice107) might infuse our legal system with kinder, 
forgiving, and less rigid processes.108  Others, like my colleague Robin West, argued 
that substantive legal principles should be informed by an “ethic of care and 
connection”109 rather than a legal liberal notion of separation.  Rather than assuming 
liberty as “freedom” from attachment to others, what would a legal system look like if 
it tried to prevent harm, heal those who were hurt, and cared for those without other 
means of care?  What if the legal documents that we have created from revolutionary 
splits from unjust “parents,” instead reflected more aspirational goals of trying to craft 
a fair and just new family or society from the beginning, with a government that was 
not necessarily viewed as the “enemy” to be distanced from, but rather a source of 
empowerment, care and protection from harm?  What if our legal aspirations 
included duties to care for, listen to, rescue, support and be kind to our fellow human 
beings, in addition to the usual prohibitions not to harm them?  How could such 
substantive norms possibly be enforced?110  In my view, attention to our recognition 
                                                
105 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171,(ratified by the U.S. 1992); International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (not yet ratified by the U.S.); see also VICKI 
JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2006).  Others 
now argue for yet a fourth generation of “rights” – the rights of non-persons (e.g., animals and 
resources such as trees, rivers, oceans, land, etc.).  This includes rights that may be asserted for 
their survival and those for fair and existence-preserving treatment. 
106 I have come to use an important phrase from the disability rights movement – we are 
all only “temporarily abled.”  Eventually, even the most “abled” of all us (who grew up from 
infancy) will likely require care from someone. 
107 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S 
DEVELOPMENT (1982). 
108 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations on A Women's Lawyering 
Process 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39-63 (1985), 
109  WEST, supra note 26. 
110 As I have argued in a variety of other venues, law appeals to the rational and principled 
in our human processes and creates certain institutions to sustain that rationality, see Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 42, when in fact much human activity may be “irrational” or “arational.”  
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of emotional, psychological and other human needs is an important element of how 
we might consider reframing legal issues—to see law as not only prohibitory, but also 
as pro-active, life-supporting and enhancing, and empowering.  To think about what 
is “right” and good, and not just what is “wrong” and punishable.111 
In addition to reframing substantive legal and moral norms, we should also 
reconfigure the processes we use to deal with conflict in our world.  Imagine, as was 
more common in earlier periods of post-war rethinking of older paradigms, that  there 
were courses of “peace studies” and conflict resolution in the first year of law 
school.112  Imagine that there was more than legalistic “A” (now appropriate, not 
alternative) DR (dispute resolution) in the curriculum, but a broader study of human 
conflict processes, including constructive, as well as destructive ones.113  Suppose we 
looked at both successful peace and non-violence projects (e.g., constitution drafting,114 
                                                                                                                           
Thus, when people do things for emotional (which may in fact be quite understandable, if not 
“rational,” reasons, see JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL 
ATTRACTIONS IN DOING EVIL, (1990); JACK KATZ, HOW EMOTIONS WORK (2001), or for 
totally irrational motivations (psychological infirmities, evil, etc.), the law in its “rationality” 
may not be the proper forum for addressing  such human behavior.  
111 Whenever I am accused of being too “touchy-feely” in my legal work, I ask who doesn’t 
want to feel better and be “touched”? 
112 See, e.g., Johan Galtung, Peace Studies a Curriculum Proposal, Center of International 
Studies, Princeton University (May 1987) (on file with the author); Johan Galtung, Peace 
Theory: An Introduction, Department of Politics, Princeton University, 1986 (on file with the 
author); Johan Galtung, “Is Peaceful Research Possible?, Chair in Conflict and Peace 
Research, University of Oslo (on file with the author, N.D.); see also HUGH MIALL, OLIVER 
RAMSBOTHAM & TOM WOODHOUSE, CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1999); 
LOUIS KRIESBERG, CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICTS: FROM ESCALATION TO RESOLUTION  
(1998); MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND 
DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES (1973). 
113 Even the most conventional of my law students now ask why forms of dispute resolution 
like negotiation and mediation are not taught more formally in Civil Procedure as they come 
to realize those forms of dispute resolution are, in fact, more common than the trial form still 
so lauded in our “thinking like a lawyer” curriculum.  See Jean Sternlight, ADR is Here: 
Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289 (2003); Stephen Subrin, 
A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196 
(2003). 
114 In addition to the more conventional doctrinal analysis of constitutional law, we might 
look at the complex and highly conflictual drafting and ratification processes, which involved 
intense political negotiation in the early years of our republic.  See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 1787-1788 (2011).  At my current 
law school, University of California, Irvine, a group of students has created a Global Justice 
Summit, a constitutional drafting exercise (each year for a different, new fictional country) to 
teach students more “constructive” legal processes and to learn to work in complex and 
conflictual settings with collaborative methods.  See EDGAR AGUILASOCHO & CARRIE 
MENKEL-MEADOW, THE GLOBAL JUSTICE SUMMIT: LEARNING TO CONSTRUCT JUSTICE 
(forthcoming). 
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treaty formation, organization (NGO and government) creation and development,115 
transactional and transnational cooperation), and as much “settlement” and 
negotiation study (as reflects real world practice116) as there was study of litigation and 
adversary processes.117  Note, I am not calling for the substitution or elimination of 
traditional law study, but for its supplementation and enhancement with a focus on 
constructive, peace-seeking legal processes.118  Lawyers help “make” things in the 
world—from concepts,119 entities, organizations, and transactions to legal rights, laws, 
and constitutions.  Might they not also be a force for peace, as well as conflict, in our 
world? Can we not teach young lawyers to be more gentle with each other and the 
clients they represent, rather than to instill the norms and practices of competition, 
debate, oppositional thinking and the desire to “win” at all costs?120  Shouldn’t 
lawyers, of all professionals, be taught to resolve disputes and make peace and to 
“intermediate” within conflicting elements of society?121 
 As a legal educator, mediator and professional trainer of the “gentler” arts of 
dispute resolution, I have now taught and trained mediators, negotiators, and 
facilitators in over 20 countries, including diplomats, government officials, lawyers 
and other legal educators and professionals.  I have attempted to teach rigorous 
problem solving, empathy, active listening, drafting, meeting management, 
facilitation, multi-party negotiation and mediation, as well as substantive concepts for 
                                                
115 Some business schools have now incorporated an NGO or non-profit organizational 
management curriculum, e.g., Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and University of 
Oxford Said Business School. 
116 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (documenting that less than 
2% of all cases filed in courts actually go to trial). 
117 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem Solving Pedagogy Seriously, 49 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 14 (1999), and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them: Integrating 
ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 801 (1993) for some earlier suggestions.  
Increasingly law school courses do add simulations and drafting exercises in the creation of 
entities, institutions, transactions, and relationships, in both domestic and international 
contexts, as opposed to purely litigation based learning. 
118 For a fuller elaboration of how I would reconstruct the legal curriculum see generally, 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and _______ Really Seriously: Before, During and After “The 
Law,” 60 VANDERBILT L. REV. 555 (2007); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem Solving 
Pedagogy Seriously, 49 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 14 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To 
Solve Problems, Not Make Them: Integrating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 801 
(1993). 
119 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 26. 
120 My students at UCI who came to create a new law school (like their predecessors years 
ago at CUNY or Antioch) were full of ideas about how to make the world a better place.  For 
me, it is sad to see how quickly some of them assimilate to the “norms” of conventional legal 
education and values. 
121 This was what Alexis de Tocqueville claimed was the particular talent of American 
lawyers—their ability to “intermediate” both class and political conflicts, as “arbiters of the 
citizens.”  See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264 (J.P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawrence trans., 1969). 
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resolution of difficult conflicts in geo-political relations,122 environmental disputes,123 
multi-cultural disputes, and more traditional legal disputes, and I have been 
heartened by how much the rest of the world, and especially “newer” polities, and 
newer law schools, have been open to exploring both new concepts and new processes 
for teaching about these subjects.  Nevertheless, given my own background, and our 
present national political climate (gridlocks in Congress, the “fiscal cliff,” heightened 
partisanship), as well as the global situation, I sometimes despair that we are not 
getting any better at this.  And, as explored briefly below, I do not and cannot 
minimize the challenges of real evil, both systemic and individual.  There are real 
philosophical, substantive and processual issues here about how we really can develop 
a jurisprudence of peace and non-violence in our world of scarce or maldistributed 
resources and multiple religions, cultural belief systems, classes, races, and other 
differences. 
Limits on a Jurisprudence of Peace: If There is “Just War” is There “Unjust 
Peace” in the Face of Systemic Evil? 
After one of my recent international educational efforts, I went to Dachau, the site 
of a major Nazi concentration camp124 where neither law, nor conflict resolution, nor 
peace seeking prevented the worst of human behavior from occurring.  
And before Dachau there was slavery, and after Dachau there continues to be 
genocide, murder, torture, rape, human trafficking, wars and other human atrocities. 
So how can one who teaches and believes in non-violent, creative and human-
empowering modes of conflict resolution deal with such violence, injustice and 
inhumanity?  If there is a theory of “just war,”125 can there be a coherent theory of 
“just peace”?  When does one committed to peace, non-violence, and creative 
problem solving reach her own limits?  When is a “peace” or ceasefire unjust (without 
justice) because it ends physical violence but does not prevent hatred, discrimination, 
other bad treatment, or unkindness or harm to others? 
In order to inform the development of more positive theories of law and peace, I 
want to mark the limits of such hopefulness with some reality. I take as my marker the 
                                                
122 Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Irena Nutenko, The Next Generation: Creating a New Peace Process 
in the Middle East, 25(4) NEGOT. J. 567 (2009). 
123 Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Joseph DiMento, A Natural Peacemaking Opportunity, DAILY 
JOURNAL, Sept. 13, 2010, at 8. 
124 Given my family history I have visited many sites of the Holocaust in Europe; I 
currently serve on the Board of the American Friends of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation 
(which seeks to preserve the concentration camp in Poland as a museum and educational site) 
and like many Americans, I have visited sites in our own nation of Indian massacres, slavery, 
incarceration, detention, and other locations of human cruelty. 
125 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
(2006); David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFFAIRS 160 
(1980). 
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notion of “systemic or systematic evil.”126  When a government or large group of 
people systematically targets other groups of people (not just as currently defined 
racial, ethnic or religious “cleansing” or genocide127 but any form of systemic harm) it 
may be even harder to “reconcile” and “restore.”128  This time at Dachau I was 
angry, not just sad, and those two emotions lie at the base of all our efforts to deal 
with evil and murder in this world.  How can human beings inflict such horrors on 
each other?  How can the rest of us stand by when it happens?  How is it that even 
after the German people have memorialized and expiated so much of their own guilt, 
other groups continue to engage in systematic torture, murder, rape and desired 
extinction of others?129  Have we learned nothing from our past? 
                                                
126 These are not, in my view, the same thing.  Systems like the Nazi system of persecution 
and death, slavery, and apartheid, are “systems” of evil.  They begin in evil dehumanizing 
design and are continued and enacted by many people within a more or less permanent and 
even legal (slavery, apartheid, Nuremberg laws) structure.  “Systematic” evil may develop 
more gradually, as when a few killings or heinous actions, seemingly random or individualized, 
are repeated, mimicked, or proliferated, either by an official political regime or by less formal 
groupings of “gangs,” factions, or groups of people with a goal of doing harm or simply doing 
bad things to many people (e.g., Rwandan genocide, which was not “legal,” but became 
systematic very quickly).  “Systematic” evil can develop without formal rules or leaders, but 
represents an absence of conscious morality or thinking about what is being done.  Some 
political regimes, like many military dictatorships, begin with a few killings of perceived or 
actual enemies and then proliferate and become both “systematic” and systemic.  See, e.g., 
PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER 
PINOCHET (1993) (discussing the years of Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile); CARLOS 
SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1998) (discussing the Dirty War in Argentina); 
NATHAN ENGLANDER, THE MINISTRY OF SPECIAL CASES (2007) (providing a remarkably 
vivid novelization of real events in Argentina’s period of recent military rule and 
“desparecidos”). 
127 The definition of genocide in relevant legal documents is relatively narrow, comprising 
acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. 
See, e.g., The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.183/9, which does not include many other “groups” (e.g., gender, political, etc.) that 
could be subjected to violent acts, including killing, maiming, raping, assault, false 
imprisonment, etc.  In my jurisprudence of non-violence this crime would be “groupocide”: 
“the targeted harming of any group or members of groups with some affinity with the intent to 
destroy, harm or seriously hurt the group or any of its members.” 
128 See, e.g., JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN 
DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1997); see also GEORGE MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE (1999). 
129 See, e.g., PETER GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE 
WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998); MICHAEL 
IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM (1993).  For a 
moving and depressing depiction of some of the most recent atrocities in the Bosnian War see 
IN THE LAND OF BLOOD AND HONEY (GK Films 2011).  See also JOHN BURTON, VIOLENCE 
EXPLAINED (1997) (John Burton was the founder of several departments of Conflict Analysis 
and Resolution, including at University College London, the University of Maryland, and 
George Mason University, the latter being among the first to grant graduate degrees in 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution).  Burton uses the concepts of “structural violence” to explain 
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In my view, what we need is the hopefulness of people like John Paul Lederach 
who conceive of peace building as a multi-generational effort, the imperatives of 
Jeremy Rifkin who tells us that new human science should help us to see the 
importance of empathizing with each other as we become increasing conscious of our 
shared human fates, the more cautionary theory building and quantitative analyses of 
political scientists who study actual human conflicts, and yes, the lawyers who still 
prosecute injustice in an increasing set of venues in our newly transnational legal 
system.  But I mostly think, at least in our own field of law, that what we need is new 
conceptualizations of what a jurisprudence of peace and non-violence would look like.  
Below I suggest some areas of concerns and questions that have emerged from my 
own work in conflict resolution, peacework, deliberative democracy and 
jurisprudence, for consideration and further elaboration:  
1. How can we prevent “dangerous and unproductive” conflict? 
2. How can we use productive or constructive conflict?130 
3. How can law create categories of meaning that do not create more injustice 
(and “violence”) but allow variations and contingencies of human behavior?131 
4. What legal remedies or outcomes can be re-imagined, beyond our more limited 
existing set of dichotomous, brittle and binary solutions to human conflicts? 
5. What legal incentives and rewards should there be for conflict preventing 
behaviors?  
6. How can law encourage collaboration and cooperation at all levels of human 
interaction—local, national, transnational? 
7. What punishments are just; what punishments make conflict and human 
flourishing worse? 
8. When should law encourage forgiveness, apology, reintegration, and reconciliation? 
                                                                                                                           
continuing violence in our societies as a product of structural inequalities and adversarial social 
institutions. 
130 Much of the human progress we have experienced so far has emerged from periods of 
great conflict—e.g., the Civil War, the civil rights movement, the women’s rights movement, 
and the gay rights movement.  Other progress has proceeded more peacefully—e.g., 
environmentalism, some religious and integrationist tolerance, some economic development, 
and some world health initiatives and cooperation (e.g., AIDS research, Avian flu containment, 
etc.). 
131 As one telling example here, consider how in criminal law determinate sentencing 
developed from a belief in greater equality with specified and uniform standards, now widely 
criticized by many.  For an earlier, richer discussion of how tailored criminal sentencing can 
lead to better outcomes, see PAMELA UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND 
NEGOTIATION IN A CRIMINAL COURT (1978); see also Allegra McLeod, Confronting Criminal 
Law’s Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 109 
(2012-2013)  
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9. How can law facilitate transitions, changes, and new regimes, without violence, as 
the circumstances of human conditions change?132 
But in addition to jurisprudential concepts and ideas we still do also need education 
and training in how we should approach each other in this world.  Can we in a law 
school environment teach such processes as: 
1. How to approach each other with grace, generosity and true curiosity, instead of the 
competitive adversarial mode so common now in legal discourse? Our 
language and orientations to each other must be trained to be “non-violent” 
in our daily lives, as well as in our legal ones?133 
2. How to listen to learn from each other about our differences, commonalties and 
where we can come together? 
3. How to solve the problems of allocation of resources, material and human, in 
equitable ways? 
4. How to create new forms of human collaboration to work together to literally make 
the world a better place? 
These days, given the on-going conflicts in domestic and foreign settings, and my 
own work in conflict resolution, I find myself moving back and forth between 
continued hopefulness and despair about the state of our human species.  
Nevertheless, though I do not think we are necessarily on a linear upward moving 
slope, (more like a curvilinear up and down with a slightly upward moving slope), I do 
think our human history so far has demonstrated increased consciousness about our 
own and other’s fragility in the world, a slowly expanding norm of inclusion and 
social justice, and a recognition that every human being has a “right” to a life of hope 
for human improvement on both spiritual and material levels.   
My own personal and legal biography has been one that began in violence and 
human harm (the experience of my parents in the Holocaust and my work in the civil 
rights and anti-war movements) but moved from the search for legal justice (through 
anti-poverty and civil rights litigation) in conventional terms to my current work in 
“softer” forms of social, political and personal justice, seeking mediative human 
understanding and problem-solving oriented conflict resolution.  I currently work in 
both domestic contexts of traditional legal and interpersonal conflicts, as well as in the 
almost intractable international disputes and conflicts in the Middle East, with a belief 
                                                
132 I am always amazed at how much we have forgotten Thomas Jefferson’s admonitions 
that a political generation is about 30 years and we should probably reconsider even some of 
our foundational legal and human structures periodically. 
133 MARSHALL ROSENBERG, NON-VIOLENT COMMUNICATION: A LANGUAGE OF LIFE 
(2003); LISA SCHIRCH, THE LITTLE BOOK OF STRATEGIC PEACEBUILDING (2004); CAROLYN 
YODER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF TRAUMA HEALING (2005); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, THE 
LITTLE BOOK OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (2003); DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON, 
& SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST 
(1999). 
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that the more brittle and conventional forms of legal justice (courts, tribunals, 
prosecutions, civil damages) are not the best answers for our human issues in 
managing conflict and violence.  
And so for me, it seems imperative that as long as some of us continue to work in 
law, we must continue to explore broader conceptions of the substantive good, 
including positive entitlements, as well as liberties or freedoms, a sense of 
responsibility toward others to be cared for and to prevent harm, and to make process 
choices and encourage participation of those effected by such processes (different 
kinds of legal processes for different kinds of legal problems).  To do this we will also 
have to remake the jurisprudential, ideational basis of law and its theories of justice, to 
work for more positive and affirmative, peaceful and sustaining, as well as just, lives.  
Without enough peace we cannot even talk to each other to create more just 
institutions, so for me at least, a jurisprudence of peace remains a condition precedent 
for the achievement of a just world.  Or as my local poet and Viet Nam veteran has 
written: 
 “ E-V-I-L is always  
   L-I-V-E reversed.”134  
From my own personal history, I have learned, we should all live to reverse as 
much evil in the world as we can, so we may all live in peace and justice. 
  
                                                
134  Wendell Brown,Thanks, in POEMS TO GO (2000). 
